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The Congress: Friend or Foe in Foreign Policy?
RICHARD PERLE*
ADDRESS
I offer the following remarks about the proper role of the Con-
gress in the formulation and execution of foreign policy as a view
from the front lines. These remarks are not theoretical. Rather, they
are the result of some years of experience in both the Congress and
now more recently in the Department of Defense. Let me say at once
that it makes a great deal of difference whether one is dealing in an
atmosphere of highly charged partisanship, or one in which a high
degree of bipartisan collaboration between the Congress and the exec-
utive branch exists. We are not in the days of Vandenberg.' Rather,
we are in a period of intense partisan political activity that affects
everything from the nomination of Justices to the Supreme Court to
foreign policy, defense policy, and security policy around the world.
It is a moment of fairly extreme partisanship, unfortunately.
The role of the Congress in the execution of foreign policy is
particularly critical and sensitive when the United States negotiates
with its adversaries. Perhaps I should make it clear at the outset that
I regard our principal adversarial negotiating opponent, the Soviet
Union, as precisely that: an adversary of the United States that is
wholly committed to a set of legal and moral values antithetical to our
own.
I am rather skeptical about the pace, direction, and ultimate des-
tination of the changes in the Soviet Union that we are observing at
this time. We do not fully understand what goes on behind the Iron
Curtain. Sources of information, insight, and knowledge that are
available in Western societies are closed to us in the Iron Curtain.
Thus, we are entirely justified in evidencing some skepticism toward
* Richard Perle is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington, D.C., a Contributing Editor to U.S. News & World Report, and a Member of the
Editorial Board of The Washington Times. He is also a Member of the Defense Policy Board
and Chairman of the Civil Applications Committee of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office.
1. See generally A. VANDENBERG, JR., THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR
VANDENBERG (1952). Arthur H. Vandenberg, a Republican Senator from Michigan, served
in the Senate from 1928 until his death in 1951. Id. at xi-xii. His last decade in office has been
characterized as a period in which "nonpartisanship... was born and nurtured and finally
adapted as a governmental mechanism through which a Democratic Executive Branch and a
Republican opposition in Congress united to speak with a single foreign-policy voice at the
water's edge." Id. at xiii.
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the meaning of glasnost2 and its likely consequences.
Negotiating with the Soviet Union is never easy. The Soviets sel-
dom make concessions, and when they do, it is never early in a negoti-
ation. They signed the Austrian State Treaty3 in 1955, following ten
years of negotiating in which they insisted on a set of arrangements
for Austria that would have left the Red Army in permanent control.
The Soviet negotiating position shifted only at the last minute. The
result is that Austria, although neutral, is a free country today.
Sir William Hayter, who served as British Ambassador to Mos-
cow, once compared negotiating with the Soviets to contending with a
nonfunctioning vending machine. He said that it may help to shake
the machine, but it is not going to do much good to talk to it.4 Nego-
tiating with the Soviets, therefore, requires enormous patience. We
must be determined in our negotiations with the Soviet Union, have a
clear notion of our objectives, and insist upon achieving them as a
condition to signing an agreement. If we follow this plan of action, I
believe that we can negotiate successfully with the Soviet Union. In
recent years, however, our tendency has been to adopt positions that
embody the principles that we seek to uphold, only to revise our
objectives steadily downward when the going gets rough, until, late in
the process, we find ourselves negotiating agreements for agreements'
sake. Unfortunately, this scenario has all too often been the pattern of
American-indeed Western-negotiations with the Soviet Union.
We can only succeed in negotiating with our adversaries if we demon-
strate steadiness, persistence, patience, and coherence.
This brings me to the role of the Congress, a body that exhibits
none of these successful negotiating characteristics. It is difficult to
describe the frustrations associated with sitting across the table from
Soviet negotiators and knowing that the Congress has adopted resolu-
tions, and in some cases, even endeavored to pass statutes, that favor
the Soviet position and criticize the American position that is on the
negotiating table.5 Four times in recent years American negotiators
have found themselves in such a situation.
In 1981 and 1982, for example, some members of Congress
2. "Glasnost'... means openness or transparency, or at the very least, publicity." Swing,
Impressions of Gorbachev: John Temple Swing on the Council on Foreign Relations Delegation's
Visit to Moscow, 1987, II INSTITUTE FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, No. 1, 5
(1987) (emphasis omitted).
3. See State Treaty for the Re-Establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria,
May 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2369, T.I.A.S. No. 3298, 217 U.N.T.S. 223.
4. See generally W. HAYTER, THE KREMLIN AND THE EMBASSY (1966) (discussing
relations between Great Britian and the Soviet Union).
5. See infra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
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embraced the concept of a nuclear freeze with enormous enthusiasm.
The United States, however, had just embarked upon an absolutely
vital program of strategic modernization. The United States was
replacing weapons systems that were on the verge of obsolescence,
replacing bomber aircrafts that were older than the pilots flying them,
replacing submarines built to last twenty years that were in the eight-
eenth, nineteenth, and in some cases the twenty-third and twenty-
fourth years of their operational lives, and replacing missiles that had
been in place since the early 1970's. The Soviet Union, for its own
reasons, thought that a nuclear freeze was a fine idea. The Soviets, by
contrast, had just completed an extensive modernization of their stra-
tegic nuclear forces. They had, therefore, every interest in preventing
the United States from taking reciprocal action that would give us the
opportunity to achieve some stable strategic balance.
The Congress, however, repeatedly voted on resolutions, in some
cases passed by the House of Representatives, that called upon the
United States to immediately freeze its nuclear forces. 6 This congres-
sional embrace of the idea of a nuclear freeze supported the Soviet
negotiating position on the table in Geneva. The Congress took this
action with astonishing ignorance about the relative position of the
strategic forces of the two sides, the impact that legislation of this
nature would have on our strategic nuclear forces modernization pro-
gram, and the strategic imbalance that would inevitably result from
such a freeze. A nuclear freeze could not possibly have been verifia-
ble, and in a fundamental sense, its effects would not have been
mutual. In the Congress, however, there was an easy way around
such problems-simply phrase the resolution to say that the United
States ought to enter into a mutual and verifiable freeze on nuclear
weapons. The Congress would then disregard the fact that that such a
resolution was a contradiction in terms because to them it was a
detail.
6. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 2, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (calling for a mutual and verifiable
freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons); H.R.J. Res. 433, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (same);
H.R.J. Res. 434, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (same); H.R.J. Res. 476, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) (same); H.R.J. Res. 521, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (same); H.R.J. Res. 571, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (same); H.R.J. Res. 573, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (same); H.R. Con.
Res. 270, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (expressing Congress' sense that action must be taken to
freeze the nuclear arms race); H.R. Con. Res. 277, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (expressing
Congress' sense that there should be an immediate mutual freeze of the nuclear arms race);
H.R. Con. Res. 287, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (expressing Congress' sense that the United
States and the Soviet Union should pursue an immediate halt to the nuclear arms race, and an
eventual reduction in the number of nuclear weapons and the size of conventional forces);
H.R. Con. Res. 351, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (urging that negotiations be initiated between
the United States and the Soviet Union with the purpose of freezing, and then reducing,
nuclear weapons arsenals to an equal and verifiable level).
19881
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The Congress has acted in a similar manner with respect to
nuclear testing. On a number of occasions, resolutions have been
passed, and in some cases, statutes have almost passed that would
have forced the administration to cease all nuclear testing.7 The sim-
ple fact is that we must engage in nuclear testing in order to maintain
a safe, secure, and survivable nuclear deterrence force. Most of us
would not buy an untested household appliance. In the view of any
expert, then, it is an unthinkable notion that we should maintain an
inventory of thousands of nuclear weapons without testing them and
without minimizing the resultant risks of possible failures and deterio-
ration leading to unsafe conditions. When the Soviets proposed an
end to nuclear testing, however, a significant number of members of
Congress endorsed that view. Despite this fact, our negotiators in
Geneva argued that we could not agree to a cessation of nuclear test-
ing. They insisted that we first conclude an agreement that would
make the existing limitations verifiable. Those negotiators, unfortu-
nately, had to cope with the knowledge that the Soviet negotiating
team was armed with ammunition provided by the Congress.
The third example of congressional involvement in negotiations
with the Soviets is familiar to many people. In this instance, Congress
insisted in the form of a statute8 that the United States continue to be
bound by the restrictions of the SALT II Treaty9 that was signed by
President Carter in 1979. Because the Senate of the United States
never even ratified this treaty, the constitutional implications of this
congressional action are truly staggering. Indeed, the treaty eventu-
ally was withdrawn by the Carter administration. It did so, in part,
because of the inconvenient invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union in December, 1979. It was additionally withdrawn because the
administration could count and, therefore, knew that the SALT II
Treaty would be defeated if it were laid before the Senate. Even if the
treaty had been ratified, it would have, nevertheless, expired by the
time President Reagan announced that the United States would no
longer consider itself bound by its terms because of repeated Soviet
violations of it and other agreements. Following the President's
announcement, however, the House of Representatives passed a bill'0
7. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 29, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (to prevent nuclear testing); S.J. Res.
224, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (same); S.J. Res. 556, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (same).
8. See H.R. 4919, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (This unenacted bill sought to limit
deployment and maintenance of nuclear weapons that would comply with existing arms
limitations agreements.).
9. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE SALT II TREATY, S. REP. No. 14, 96 Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979).
10. See H.R. 4919, supra note 8.
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aimed at preventing the expenditure of any funds for the purpose of
maintaining a strategic arms inventory that exceeded the limits of the
SALT II Treaty. In fact, it was even worse than that. The Congress
went so far as to select provisions of the SALT II Treaty by which it
would have us be bound.1' The provisions that the Congress chose to
include set precisely those limitations that most profoundly inhibited
the United States, and did not inhibit the Soviet Union.
The last example of congressional involvement is a current one.
It is one that I suspect we will be hearing a great deal about because it
concerns the interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. ' 2 The President
and his chief legal adviser at the Department of State, as well as other
lawyers throughout the government, have studied the record of that
negotiation intensively, fairly, and accurately. These people have con-
cluded that a close reading of the ABM Treaty and the accompanying
negotiating records, fully justifies a broader interpretation of the
treaty than has previously been the position of prior administrations.
For example, Judge Sofaer conducted an intensive study of the
records of the ABM Treaty negotiations.1 3 This study occurred after
some Defense Department lawyers examined that record and con-
cluded that statements made in 1972, when the treaty was signed,
purporting to express the rights and obligations of the parties, had
misstated the nature of these obligations in important respects. Due
to abundant evidence that existed to support the conclusion of the
Defense Department lawyers, Judge Sofaer reached the same conclu-
sion. Abe Sofaer's motives, however, were brutally attacked, and the
Congress has now passed legislation in the House and in the Senate.
It remains to be seen what will emerge in the Defense Authorization
Bill that seeks to compel the President of the United States to respect
an interpretation of the SALT II Treaty, that he and his principal
advisers have concluded is improper and incorrect. 14 Senator Nunn,
who has led this effort in the Senate, had the audacity to suggest that
the issue here is the integrity of the Constitution.
The administration has occasionally had the opportunity to
negotiate with the Soviet Union without the encumbrance of congres-
11. See H.R. 4919, supra note 8, at § 1 (limiting strategic weapons).
12. Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
13. See Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARv. L. REv.
1972 (1986).
14. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,
§§ 1001-1004, 100 Stat. 3816, 3957-59 (1986) (enunciating Congress' sense that the United
States should "continue voluntary compliance with the central numerical sublimits of the
SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviet Union complies with such sublimits").
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sional actions that give aid and comfort to our negotiating adversa-
ries. The most prominent example of this negotiating freedom took
place with respect to intermediate nuclear missiles. In 1981, the Pres-
ident developed and presented a policy calling for the elimination of
the entire category of intermediate nuclear missiles. The Soviet
Union flatly and categorically rejected this proposal. Then Secretary
of State Alexander Haig opposed the President's proposal, however,
because he believed it would prove to be nonnegotiable."5 Mr. Haig
has subsequently written in his memoirs that the proposal by the
President was based on "absurd" expectations, and was "not
negotiable."16
In this instance, unlike in others, the Congress gave the adminis-
tration solid support in its plans to deploy intermediate nuclear mis-
siles in Europe, and to conduct the negotiations as it saw fit. It is
worth observing that in seven years of negotiating with the Soviet
Union, the elimination of intermediate nuclear missiles is the one area
in which we have succeeded, or almost succeeded, in concluding a
treaty. I believe that this treaty is in the interest of the United States.
It is, however, a treaty that the Soviets said they would never sign.
Indeed, they walked out of the negotiations in 1983, rather than nego-
tiate on the basis of the President's proposal. It is a treaty that will
require the Soviets to remove four or five warheads, depending on
one's intelligence estimate, for every one that the United States
removes. The potentiality of this treaty is, I believe, a tribute to the
persistence, patience, and determination of President Reagan and Sec-
retary of Defense Weinberger, for friends and allies urged them, at
almost every turn, to abandon the proposal and accept something
more appealing to the Soviets.
It is not only in dealing with adversaries that the Congress can,
and often does, encumber the effectiveness of executive authority.
One frequently finds that the Congress makes it difficult, and in some
cases impossible, for the executive branch to negotiate effectively with
its allies. As currently amended, the Foreign Assistance Act of 196117
is approximately 2,000 pages in length. It is worth recalling the atti-
tude towards this type of congressional micromanagement from the
viewpoint of a former chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
J. William Fulbright. Fulbright argued that the Congress does indeed
detract from the ability of the President to properly conduct foreign
15. See A. HAIG, JR., CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY 223-29
(1984).
16. Id. at 229.
17. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1982, Supp. I. 1983 & Supp. 11 1984)).
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affairs.18 He reasoned that although the Congress possesses many
powers under the Constitution that relate to foreign affairs, it, never-
theless, remains ill-equipped to initiate or shape foreign policy. "9 Yet
a short time later, Fulbright presided over hundreds of amendments
to the Foreign Assistance Act that made it virtually impossible for the
United States to extend assistance to friends and allies without a bat-
tery of lawyers and endless delays.
What had happened in the interim? The principle of congres-
sional restraint that Fulbright found paramount when the Congress
was reluctant to permit President Kennedy to extend aid to Poland
and Yugoslavia became an entirely different matter when the issue
was extending aid to the Republic of Vietnam in the late 1960's.
Thus, it is wise to be skeptical of general principles concerning the
proper role of Congress when one hears them from members of
Congress.
The role of Congress with respect to aid to the Contras exempli-
fies the need for such skepticism. Several Boland amendments20 were
passed over a period of four years. Each one imposed some restric-
tions on the freedom of the Executive to give assistance to the Con-
tras, but never enough to prevent some form of assistance from
continuing to flow. This type of congressional involvement in foreign
policymaking has effectively obscured the responsibilities of all of the
parties involved and rendered incoherent the President's desire to give
assistance to the Contras in Nicaragua.
Finally, let me say a word about the role of the Congress in the
18. Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under An 18th-Century
Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 5 (1961).
19. Id. Fulbright attributes the Congress' ineffectiveness in pursuing foreign policy
objectives to the wide dispersal of powers throughout the Congress, sensitivity to executive
encroachment, and the "glacial legislative process," which is the appropriations process. Id.
20. Between 1982 and 1984, Congressman Edward Boland of Massachusetts sponsored
three initiatives affecting military aid to the Nicaraguan paramilitary force known as the
Contras. The Boland amendment prohibited military aid "to any group or individual, not part
of a country's armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua."
Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982). The Boland cap limited financial support for
direct or indirect military operations in Nicaragua to $24 million of Department of Defense or
intelligence agency funds during fiscal year 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-212, § 775, 97 Stat. 1452
(1983). The Boland cutoff provided that no funds made available to any intelligence agency
and the Department of Defense could be used to support direct or indirect military operations
in Nicaragua during fiscal year 1985. Congress did, however, permit up to $14 million in such
support if, among other things, the President reports to Congress that the support is necessary
and that the government in Nicaragua is providing support to anti-government forces in
Central America. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1935 (1984). See Congress Sought to
Place Limits Early on US Covert Assistance to 'Contras', 41 CONG. Q. 76, 76-77 (1985)
(discussing the history of the Boland initiatives and the political atmosphere surrounding their
adoptions).
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disposition of military power. I would not presume to comment on
the War Powers Resolution,2' about which there are many experts at
this symposium whose knowledge is greater than my own, except to
say that it strikes me as one of the sillier pieces of legislation to
emerge in the last two decades. This law represents an abject lesson
with respect to the passage of legislation in the aftermath of great
upheavals and events that lead the Congress to rush to correct what it
believes to be yesterday's mistakes. In my judgment, as one who sat
through that debate from the vantage point of a Senate staff member,
the War Powers Resolution was intended, more than anything else, to
create the impression that the Vietnam War had somehow been the
responsibility of excessive independent activity by the executive
branch. The history is perfectly clear in showing, however, that every
single authorization and appropriation act enabling that war to be
fought was passed by a majority of both houses of Congress.
We are now engaged in protecting our interests, our democratic
values, and the interests and democratic values of our friends and
allies in a world in which we seldom encounter war declared in the
traditional sense. We frequently encounter a test of wills, in which
military power, and the willingness to bring military power to bear, is
a crucial ingredient in the decisions that are made both among friends
and among adversaries.
An observant Turkish officer once said, "[T]he trouble with you
Americans is you are always stabbing yourselves in the back." There
is an important lesson here. Our enemies abroad know that they can
shop for venues. They know that the power and authority of the
Executive may well be limited by congressional encroachment on the
use of military power, or on the budgets supporting military forces.
Our enemies have a variety of strategies at their disposal that threaten
our ability to operate effectively.
Our adversaries have discovered that if they can create sufficient
confusion about the facts and the circumstances in which executive
actions have to be taken, they can frequently mount effective cam-
paigns in the Congress to restrain any coherent or persistent action.
They have also discovered that the Congress does not handle ambigu-
ity well. Situations need to be crystal clear in order for the Congress
to coalesce behind the exercise of executive authority. The exercise of
such executive authority is so vital, and so fundamental, in the dan-
gerous world in which we live. Thus, our enemies have found ways to
exploit the division of authority and responsibility between the Con-
21. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
[Vol. 43:91
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gress and the Executive, in a manner that fundamentally threatens
our ability to protect our interests.
There is no substitute in this world for strong executive authority
that is backed by the Congress. There is also no substitute in a
democracy for the concomitant political accountability that can cause
the elected officials of the Congress to give the Executive the support
that is necessary to protect this nation and its friends around the
world.
